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Numerous studies claim to have shown that false memories can be easily created in the laboratory. However, a
critical analysis of the methods employed in these studies indicates that many of them do not address memory in
the strict sense of the word. Instead, some of these studies assess the confidence that participants have in a fictitious
(childhood) event, while others pertain to false beliefs about childhood events. While it is difficult to draw precise
demarcation lines, we argue that inflated confidence, false beliefs, and false memories are different phenomena.
Keeping the origins of these studies in mind (i.e., people who file lawsuits on the basis of their recovered
memories), we propose that a fruitful, but stringent definition of false memories would incorporate their
consequences. Thus, we argue that this research domain would profit from studies looking explicitly at whether
experimental manipulations intended to implant false memories have overt behavioral consequences.
D 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Since the pioneering work of Bartlett (1932), research on memory has only gradually given up its
preoccupation with accurate reproduction of previously learned words (Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky,
2000). Today, however, there is a broad consensus among psychologists about the inherently
constructive nature of episodic memory and its proneness to distortions. Two laboratory paradigms
have contributed to this consensus (Dodhia & Metcalfe, 1999; Mazzoni, 2002; Reyna, 2000). The first is
the classic misleading information paradigm, in which participants are provided with misleading
information about an event that they witnessed. When participants are later asked to recall the event,0272-7358/$ -
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T. Smeets et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 25 (2005) 917–934918some of them will give false details on the basis of the misleading information. For example, in a study
by Ackil and Zaragoza (1998), participants watched a movie fragment about boys at a summer camp
showing one of the individuals tripping and falling. Next, the researchers suggested that that person was
bleeding, although the video fragment had not shown this. When later asked where the individual was
bleeding, some participants misremembered the suggested information as being accurate and gave
detailed descriptions of where he was bleeding.
The second paradigm is the so-called false memory paradigm. In contrast to the misleading
information paradigm, the false memory paradigm does not confront participants with misleading
information. Here, false memories1 are said to result from participants’ deductive inferences or internally
created constructs that they subsequently mistake for externally experienced events (i.e., source
monitoring errors, see Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 1994). A good example of this
approach is Bartlett’s seminal study, where he had participants recount a story (bThe War of the GhostsQ;
see Bartlett, 1932) that was previously read to them. Due to their tendency to fill in memory gaps with
internally generated schematic knowledge, participants changed or erroneously recalled certain details of
the story (see for more recent examples, Bergman & Roediger, 1999; Spiro, 1980).
Since the mid-1990s both approaches have attracted considerable attention from psychologists as well
as a broader audience. This interest in false memory research was mainly fostered by a cascade of cases
in which people, during the course of a psychotherapeutic treatment, suddenly came to brecoverQ what
seem to be previously inaccessible memories of traumatic childhood events (e.g., sexual abuse). There
are conflicting opinions about the accuracy of these recovered memories. Many clinicians believe that
such memories are essentially accurate (e.g., Andrews et al., 1995; Van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). Other
authors, among whom are experimental as well as clinical psychologists, have pointed out that recovered
memories may reflect an iatrogenic effect. They argue that certain psychotherapeutic techniques (e.g.,
hypnosis, dream interpretation) may very well elicit fantasies and imaginations that are experienced as
autobiographical memories (e.g., Loftus & Ketcham, 1994; Ofshe & Watters, 1994). By this view,
recovering memories during therapy may be nothing more than the construction of false memories. The
credibility of recovered memories has lead to a heated controversy between both positions, with each
side imposing high standards of proof upon the other side2 (see, for a more thorough analysis, Read,
1999).
While the recovered memory debate is still inspiring extensive reviews (e.g., Brewin, 2003; McNally,
2003), both positions seem to have gotten closer to one another (Ost, 2003; Schooler, 1999). For
example, many authors now acknowledge that false memories recovered during therapy do exist (Health
Council of the Netherlands, 2004; Sivers, Schooler, & Freyd, 2002) and that accurate memories that
have long not been thought about may be experienced as recovered memories. One positive side-effect
of the recovered memory debate is that it has given rise to a huge experimental literature on how certain
manipulations may affect people’s judgments about their memories. This, in turn, has informed
clinicians about the potential risks of certain therapeutic interventions (e.g., hypnosis, imagination
exercises, dream interpretation). However, some critics (e.g., Freyd & Gleaves, 1996) have argued that
generalizations from the experimental to the clinical context are difficult to make. Although points about1
We define false autobiographical memories or pseudo-memories as recollections of events that never happened or that are recalled very
differently from how they actually happened. In this article, we use the popular term false memory rather than the more neutral term pseudo-
memory. We acknowledge, though, that false memory has negative connotations and that this has led to some terminological confusion.
2
Lindsay (1997, p. 1) refers to this as the bentrenchment effectQ.
T. Smeets et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 25 (2005) 917–934 919generalization problems are often somewhat gratuitous, we believe that these critics might be right in one
important respect. In what follows, we critically discuss methods, results, and conclusions that one
commonly encounters in the experimental literature on false memories. This shows us that – despite the
diversity in methodologies and results – most authors interpret their results in terms of false memories. In
doing so, they often employ the terms false memory and pseudo-memory in a rather loose way.
Consequently, these terms are at risk of becoming of little substance. Our goal is to illustrate this point. It
is not our intention to provide the reader with an exhaustive review of the false memory literature.
Rather, we want to advocate a more disciplined use of key concepts like confidence, false belief, and
false memory. That many current research papers use these terms in a liberal way, does not mean that we
regard them as unimportant or irrelevant. Instead, we argue that as long as studies in this area do not
address the definitional issue, there are limits to their applicability to real life situations (e.g., the
courtroom).1. Neurotransmitters as a metaphor for false memories
The term neurotransmitter was first used by the Austrian researcher Otto Loewi in 1921. It started a
revolution in biology as many physiologists promptly concentrated their research on the identification
and functioning of neurotransmitters. This resulted in a rapid expansion of publications in this area of
research. The proliferation of the term neurotransmitter led researchers to consider virtually all
substances in the human brain as neurotransmitters. To avoid that it would become meaningless,
redefining the term neurotransmitter using stringent criteria was inevitable (Axelrod, 1974). Thus, for
example, a candidate substance only attains neurotransmitter status when it can be shown that it is
involved in physiologic transmission (Boehning & Snyder, 2003). Not surprisingly, then, a considerable
amount of research on putative neurotransmitters focuses on their consequences: do they affect post-
synaptic transmission?
In contemporary research, the term false memory is used in a rather liberal way. For example, some
studies deal with a belief in a fictitious event (i.e., a false belief). In some cases, even this interpretation
is too generous because a confidence estimate of a particular event rather than a belief is the dependent
variable. Conferring a memory status upon beliefs and confidence estimates is like treating every
substance in the brain as a neurotransmitter. Our point is not new. For example, Sivers et al. (2002, p.
182) noted that: bAnother concern regarding false memory studies involves the degree to which the ideas
that individuals generate are best described as false memories. Many studies that have been characterized
as involving the creation of false memories have not actually caused individuals to specifically recall
events that never occurred but rather have caused them to believe [italics added] that such events might
have occurred.Q Our impression is that the experimental literature on false memories has largely ignored
differences between confidence estimates, beliefs, and memories. To some extent this has to do with
difficulties in defining the key concept of memory. Thus, for example, the neuropsychologist Dimond
(1980) viewed memory as a pervasive feature of the brain ranging from immunological reactions to
autobiography.33
Over the past two decades, the concept of memory has extended its scope to include not only autobiographical recollections, but also
perceptual priming, Pavlovian conditioned responses, and so forth. Thus, the broad use of the term false memory has its origin in the broadened
concept of dmemoryT itself (e.g., Tulving, 2000).
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Studies intending to examine false memories often rely on techniques such as imagination inflation
(Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996), dream interpretation (Mazzoni, Loftus, Seitz, & Lynn,
1999; Mazzoni, Lombardo, Malvagia, & Loftus, 1999), and personalized suggestions (e.g., Hyman &
Billings, 1998; Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Loftus & Mazzoni, 1998; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999).
There are also studies that draw on real life situations. A case in point is the study by Crombag,
Wagenaar, and van Koppen (1996), who used the 1992 El-Al airplane crash on Amsterdam as their
starting point (see below). Whatever the technique, authors claim to investigate false memories, either
explicitly (e.g., Garry & Polascheck, 2000; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003; Paddock et al., 1998) or by
suggesting that the obtained results are pertinent to the recovered memory debate (e.g., Hyman &
Billings, 1998; Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001).
Work on imagination inflation (e.g., Clancy, McNally, & Schacter, 1999; Garry et al., 1996; Goff &
Roediger, 1998; Heaps & Nash, 1999; Horselenberg et al., 2000; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003; Paddock et
al., 1998, 1999) offers examples of the terminological confusion that may arise. Here, participants are
asked to fill out a Life Events Inventory (LEI; Garry et al., 1996), a questionnaire comprising 60
descriptions of certain events. Participants are asked to rate the probability that the events might have
happened to them when they were a child. Sample items would be bGot in trouble for calling 911Q,
bBroke a window with your handQ, and bWon a stuffed animal at a carnival gameQ. After one or two
weeks, participants are asked to vividly imagine some of the situations that are described by the LEI
items. Afterwards, participants are instructed to complete the LEI for a second time. Typically,
researchers find that an event that was rated as unlikely increases in subjective probability after
participants have imagined the event. Some authors argue that this imagination inflation effect tells us
something about autobiographical memory distortions. For example, Paddock et al. (1998, p. S65) state
that b[. . .] these results might provide insight into the mechanisms and processes by which false
memories of childhood trauma may be created in psychotherapy.Q On a related note, Garry and
Polascheck (2000, p. 6) opine that bA growing body of literature shows that imagining contrary-to-truth
experiences can change memory [italics added].Q Of course, these authors might be right. Yet, strictly
speaking LEI items tap how confident participants are of having experienced a certain childhood event.
They are not about having a detailed memory of that particular event.
Confidence is not the same as (false) memory. At most, inflated confidence constitutes a first step in
the construction of false memories, just like l-DOPA is only a precursor of the neurotransmitter
dopamine. Logically, it is perfectly possible to have inflated confidence without having false memories.
More recent imagination inflation studies, like those by Mazzoni et al. (1999) or Mazzoni and Memon
(2003) do not use the term false memory. Instead, these authors interpret their results in terms of false
beliefs. In a recent review article, Loftus (2001, p. 585) pointed out that bMost of the studies of
imagination inflation have shown shifts in belief, but have not explored whether actual memories or
false memories accompany those shifts.Q However, given that imagination inflation studies rely on
confidence estimates, even the term false belief may not always be justified. Suppose someone’s
confidence in a particular event (e.g., bBroke a window with your handQ) increases from 1 to 3 on an 8-
point scale (anchors: 1 = definitely did not happen; 8 = definitely did happen) as a result of an
imagination exercise. Does this person really belief that this specific event happened to him or her? We
don’t think so. This is not to say that an increase from 1 to 3 on the 8-point confidence scale is trivial. In
fact, it is highly relevant to, for example, clinical interventions (e.g., cognitive therapy; see Rachman,
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attribute to certain events (e.g., not having a panic attack when entering a shop). But subjective
probabilities are not the same as beliefs. In our opinion, it only makes sense to frame imagination
inflation effects in terms of bbeliefQ when confidence inflation is so large that it crosses the midpoint of
the confidence scale. As far as we can see, only Heaps and Nash (1999) explicitly mention the
differences between confidence, belief, and memory. Other authors summarize the results in this
research domain in a way that does little justice to these differences. So, for example, Garry and
Polascheck (2000; p. 8) say that bimagination can change autobiographies.Q Again, these authors might
be right, but to date there is no imagination inflation study that fully documents this point. What can be
said with some confidence, though, is that the effect of imagination not only inflates the confidence
ratings of participants, but also undermines more fundamental memory processes. Thus, for example,
Goff and Roediger (1998) found that imagining certain actions compromised the accuracy of source
monitoring judgments (i.e., participants claimed to have performed rather than having imagined
actions). Follow-up studies by Thomas and Loftus (2002) and Thomas, Bulevich, and Loftus (2003)
indicate that these source monitoring errors persist even for actions that can be considered bizarre had
they actually happened (e.g., kissing a magnifying glass).3. Suggestion
Similar points can be raised about studies relying on dream interpretation or personalized suggestion.
The first approach uses dream interpretation as the source of suggestion (e.g., Loftus & Mazzoni, 1998;
Mazzoni et al., 1999; Rassin, Merckelbach, & Spaan, 2001; see also Pesant & Zadra, 2004). Here,
participants are asked to write down their recent dreams, on the basis of which the experimenter provides
participants with suggestions about a childhood event that supposedly happened to them. Subsequently,
the event is presented as the causal antecedent of their current dreams. Finally, participants have to rate
their confidence in the suggested childhood event or have to provide memory reports on the event.
Another version of this approach uses suggestions embedded in hypnotic and non-hypnotic
procedures to elicit certain information from participants (e.g., Spanos, Burgess, Burgess, Samuels, &
Blois, 1999; Spanos, Gwynn, Comer, Baltruweit, & de Groh, 1989). Although these are well-designed
studies that yielded highly interesting effects, they are sometimes very liberal in their terminology. For
example, Mazzoni et al. (1999) say that participants showing an increase in LEI scores subsequent to
dream interpretation held beliefs (p. 141) about the suggested events. This might be a problematic
conclusion (cf. supra). The authors go even further when they state that about half of their
experimentally manipulated participants also had memories (p. 142) of these events. This conclusion
is based on a single question that participants answered: bWould you describe to me the memory you
have for this event? Try to remember as much as you can, but please try to spend only three minutes on
each questionQ (Mazzoni et al., 1999, p. 131). Next, two groups were formed: those who said to have
memories of the events and those who did not. Participants were classified as having a memory of the
event when b[. . .] subjects gave some indication [italics added] of having a memoryQ (Mazzoni et al.,
1999, p. 137). Participants were classified as having no memory for the event when they b[. . .] actually
wrote dno memoryT, dcannot remember this really happeningT, or something similar [italics added]Q
(Mazzoni et al., 1999, p. 137). Given this liberal way of defining memory reports, it remains to be seen
whether the authors really succeeded in eliciting full-blown false memories.
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& Billings, 1995; Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Loftus & Mazzoni, 1998; Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay,
2002), information about a fictitious event (e.g., spilling a punch bowl at a wedding) is suggested to
participants by claiming that the information was gathered from participants’ parents or close relatives.
The frequently cited experiments of Hyman and Billings (1998) and Hyman and Pentland (1996) tried to
elicit false memories by using this type of personalized suggestion (for a more recent example, see Ost,
Foster, Costall, & Bull, in press). Participants were interviewed on several occasions about the suggested
events and the researchers examined to what extent participants accepted the suggestions. Participants
were eventually categorized in four groups. First, there was a bclear false memoryQ category containing
participants, who said that they clearly remembered the particular event. These participants tried to
complete their memories by providing progressively more details. Second, there was a bpartial false
memoryQ group of participants, who elaborated on the contextual details, but nevertheless said they had
no specific memories of the incident. Thirdly, there was a group of participants, who tried to remember
the incident, but said that they had no memories (btrying but no memoryQ group). Finally, there was a
bno memoryQ group of participants, who essentially refused to attempt to recall information about the
event. Using this classification format, Hyman and Pentland (1996) categorized 25% of their participants
as bclear false memoryQ as opposed to 12.5% bpartial false memoryQ, 62.5% btrying but no memoryQ, and
0% bno memoryQ.
Though Hyman and Pentland’s (1996) criteria were more precise than those of many other authors,
the question arises to what extent participants in the first category (i.e., the clear false memory group)
really remembered the suggested fictitious event. Participants in this category came up with all sorts of
new, probably inaccurate details, indicating that they believed that the fictitious event truly took place.
But whether they actually remembered the details they came up with or whether they merely proposed
them as a way of speculating about the event remains unclear.4 Schwarz (1999) pointed out that
participants usually adopt a cooperative attitude. Even when researchers pose nonsensical questions to
participants, there is always a subgroup of participants who provides an answer as a way of being helpful
to the researchers. Specifically, Schwarz (1999, p. 96) noted that bFrom a conversational point of view,
the sheer fact that a question about some issue is asked presupposes that the issue exists.Q Thus, one
wonders to what extent the bclear false memoryQ participants in Hyman and Pentland’s (1996) study tried
to be helpful by presenting speculations as memories to the researchers.4. The El-Al crash
Some authors have argued that suggestion may help create false memories for real life events. A study
by Crombag et al. (1996) used a public event (i.e., the 1992 El-Al airplane crash) to find out whether
people would claim to have memories of non-existing television scenes of this event. Thus, Crombag et
al. sought to investigate their participants’ memory for real television fragments of the El-Al Boeing 747
crashing into the buildings. To that end, the authors asked a simple forced choice (yes/no) question,4
It is worthy of note that Hyman and Billings (1998) showed that false recalls obtained with their procedure were not related to participants’
sensitivity to social demand. This is an important finding, but our point is, of course, broader. It may well be that most participants evaluated the
experimental situation as a problem-oriented task and that some of them tried to be helpful by speculating about the fictitious event.
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et al., 1996, p. 99). When answered affirmative, this was followed by one or more multiple choice
questions, like bAfter the plane hit the building, there was a fire. How long did it take for the fire to
start?Q (Crombag et al., 1996, p. 99). Crombag et al. found that over half of their participants (55% in
study 1 and 66% in study 2) claimed to have seen the (non-existing) fragments. They speculated that the
misleading suggestions embedded in their questions may have led their participants to come to believe
that they saw a television fragment that in fact did not exist.
Because many participants gave detailed answers to the follow-up questions, Crombag et al. (1996, p.
102) also concluded that b[. . .] apparently these subjects had formed images [. . .].Q In our view, the high
percentage of participants claiming to have seen the film fragment does not necessarily mean that all of
them actually had false memories or images. Another possibility is that participants, due to the highly
suggestive context, drew upon general knowledge heuristics (e.g., ba plane crash causes an immediate
explosionQ) rather than false memories when they answered the follow-up questions. As well,
participants may have been eager to please the researchers and, hence, might have provided socially
desirable answers without really believing them. In both cases, there is no need to postulate underlying
false memories.5 In a highly similar study by Ost, Vrij, Costall, and Bull (2002), 44% of the participants
were willing to report that they had seen television fragments of the 1997 fatal crash of Diana, Princess
of Wales, when in fact, no such film material exists. Interestingly, these authors found evidence that
compliance (i.e., eagerness to please) may be a key factor in explaining why so many of their
participants claimed to have seen the non-existing fragment. Ost et al. do not claim that their participants
had developed false memories. In interpreting their findings, the authors are conservative in that they
state that participants bclaimed to have seenQ (e.g., p. 132) the television fragment of Princess Diana’s car
crash.5. The story so far and its significance
We may conclude, then, that experimental research on false memories is often vague and confusing
when it comes to the point of whether effects exceed the level of weak or even strong beliefs. Of course,
experimental work that shows how people can come to believe in fictitious events is fascinating and
highly relevant. After all, there are patients who come to believe during therapy that they were the victim
of childhood sexual abuse without ever having memories of these events (McNally, 2003; Ost, Costall,
& Bull, 2001; Ost, Costall, & Bull, 2002). Indeed, these patients have much in common with patients
who during therapy recover full-blown memories of being molested as children (McNally, 2003). For
example, both groups are vulnerable to false alarms on recognition tasks (Clancy, Schacter, McNally &
Pitman, 2000) and, contrary to what many clinicians believe, are not particularly skilled in forgetting
trauma-related words (McNally, Clancy, & Schacter, 2001). Still, it is wise to differentiate between belief
and memory. Germane to this issue is that McNally, Clancy, Schacter, and Pitman (2000) also noted
subtle differences between patients with recovered memories of abuse and patients with beliefs about
childhood abuse. For example, McNally et al. (2000) reported that patients who merely believed in that5
Davis, Loftus, and Follette (2001, p. 151) noted that the study by Crombag et al. reflected false beliefs rather than false memories. They
stated that bClearly, these memories were nothing more than beliefs based on descriptions heard on T.V.Q
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with recovered memories of abuse, who in turn scored higher than patients who had always remembered
their abuse.
Of course, false memories do exist. It would be foolish to deny that vivid memories of alien abduction
episodes, held by some people who underwent hypnotic therapy, may be classified as false memories
(Clancy, McNally, Schacter, Lenzenweger, & Pitman, 2002). A similar line of reasoning applies to the
detailed descriptions some people give of their memories of previous life experiences (Gomperts, 1996;
Horselenberg & Merckelbach, submitted for publication). But, sometimes there is a clear asymmetry
between belief and memory. For example, in his work on bretractorsQ (i.e., people who retract their
allegations of childhood sexual abuse), Ost (2003, p. 134) noted that with many of these individuals
memory is simply not the issue: bOne retractor reported that she believed for 11 years that she had been
abused, yet never actually came to remember the abuse.Q Ost goes on to add: bWhen someone becomes
convinced that a past event occurred whilst simultaneously claiming not to be able to remember that
event, then factors other than da memoryT were clearly crucial in her decision.Q
More parametric research focusing on the phenomenal experiences of people claiming alien
abductions, previous lives or childhood sexual abuse is required, because it could give us better clues as
to how to draw the demarcation lines between confidence, belief, and memory.6. Confidence estimates, false beliefs, and false memories
Gardiner and Java (1993, p. 163) wrote that bThe science of memory continues to be hampered by
terminological confusion and excess. The same terms are often used to mean different things. Different
terms are often used to mean the same things. Conceptual and theoretical progress would be easier if the
use of terminology were to be reformed.Q We believe that their words bear relevance to false memory
research. That is, this research domain would profit from stricter criteria for what counts as a false
memory. A first step would be to make a distinction between confidence estimates about fictitious
events, beliefs about such events, and false memories. Sporadically, authors do make this distinction.6
Johnson and Raye (2000, p. 36), for example, noted that bPeople tend to use the word dmemoryT
when a mental experience or report of a mental experience is detailed, including information
indicating that one experienced the event oneself, and they tend to use the word dbeliefT when it does
not have contextual details and for a broad range of mental experiences or reports that seem to assert
present or past general states of affairs which may or may not involve personally experienced events
(including the events from which the belief was derived, such as reading a newspaper).Q Likewise,
Read and Lindsay (1994, p. 429) stated that b[. . .] some cases of inaccurate delayed accusations might
be better characterized as involving false beliefs rather than illusory memories.Q In a similar vein, Ost
(2003, p. 135) noted that bThe problems arising from false claims and also incorrectly rejected claims
of sexual abuse are not just about dmemoryT as traditionally conceived and, in some cases, may have
very little to do with dmemoriesT at all, whether dfalseT or drecoveredT.Q Differentiating between belief
and memory is also important to experimental investigators, as it may be much easier to elicit false6
Excellent chapters on the relationship between belief and memory of an event can be found in Schacter and Scarry (2000). On a minor point,
also notice that Kopelman (1999) distinguishes between belief (delusions) and memory (delusional memory) among psychiatric patients.
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memory on the basis of phenomenological experiences accompanying the retrieval of information. Thus,
Tulving’s remember–know distinction implies that if retrieval is accompanied by conscious recollection,
participants experience a remember response. If, on the other hand, retrieval is accompanied by feelings
of familiarity in the absence of conscious recollection, one is to speak of a know response (Gardiner &
Java, 1993; Tulving, 1985). Interestingly, some studies on false memories have collected direct
remember–know judgments from their participants. For example, such data have been obtained in the
context of the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott,
1995). Although this approach might be informative as it strikes the heart of the point we want to make,
some authors have noted that participants not always find it easy to distinguish between remember and
know judgments (e.g., Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson Klavehn, 2002).
Several factors may modulate the confidence ratings that people give to particular childhood events.
Among other factors, generic knowledge about the type of event (i.e., schematic knowledge), base rate
of the event, fantasy proneness and suggestibility of the individual, and a lack of confidence in one’s
own memory7 may affect subjective likelihood estimates (e.g., Heaps & Nash, 1999, Thomas et al.,
2003). Whether one comes to believe the thought of having experienced a particular event depends to
some extent on how plausible one judges the event to be (Hyman & Kleinknecht, 1999; Loftus, 2003). If
the prima facie plausibility is considered to be low, this will result in disbelief (denial of the thought). If,
on the other hand, the subjective likelihood is judged to be high, one will often start to believe in and
become convinced of actually having experienced the event. Germane to this issue is the finding of
Pezdek, Finger, and Hodge (1997) that highly plausible events (e.g., getting lost in a shopping mall)
were more likely to be endorsed by their participants than less plausible events (e.g., having a rectal
enema). Note that research also suggests that familiarity and plausibility are not static qualities. Thus,
work by Goff and Roediger (1998) and Thomas and Loftus (2002) indicates that with multiple acts of
imagination, people can be led to believe that they performed an unusual action (e.g., sit on a dice).7. Models
Over the past 10 years or so, several models have been invoked to account for the development of
false beliefs and false memories (e.g., Hyman & Kleinknecht, 1999; Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002;
Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986). One of the first attempts was that by Tousignant et al. (1986); also see
Schooler & Loftus, 1986) and involved a principle known as Discrepancy Detection. According to this
principle, bRecollections are most likely to change if a person does not immediately detect discrepancies
between post-event suggestions and memory for the original eventQ (Schooler & Loftus, 1986, p. 107–
108). Discrepancy detection is assumed to be influenced by two factors: (1) the strength of the
information that was originally encoded, and (2) the manner in which the post-event suggestion was
presented to the participant.8 The implication of this is that (partial) amnesia is a necessary condition for
the development of a full-blown false autobiographical memory.7
This phenomenon, in which people come to doubt the quality of their own memory, is known as the memory distrust syndrome (Gudjonsson
& MacKeith, 1982).
8
A more recent version of the discrepancy detection principle can be found in Lindsay (1990), who in this context wrote about the
discrimination hypothesis.
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development of false (childhood) memories involves three processes: event acceptance (plausibility
assessment), memory construction, and a source monitoring error. First, a person has to judge the
suggested event as plausible. That is, the person should believe that the event could have happened.
Factors that may have an effect on the plausibility assessment are the source of the suggestion, the nature
of the event itself, and the likelihood of having personally experienced a similar event. Second, apart
from believing that the suggested event is likely to have happened, a person b[. . .] must still construct a
memory — an image with a narrativeQ (Hyman & Kleinknecht, 1999, p. 180). Finally, one must
misinterpret the constructed memory as an autobiographical memory. Thus, one has to make a source
monitoring error and mistakenly claim the memory for an authentic personal memory. According to
Hyman and Kleinknecht (1999, p. 181), b[. . .] all three processes are necessary for false memory
creation and [that they] are somewhat independent in the sense that different factors influence each
process.Q
A somewhat different conceptualization of false memories has recently been proposed by Mazzoni
and Kirsch (2002). Although these authors noted that their model is in many ways consistent with that of
Hyman and Kleinknecht (1999), they also point at one major discrepancy between both models. Thus,
Mazzoni and Kirsch’s (2002) model distinguishes between belief and memory. More specifically, these
authors emphasize that autobiographical beliefs involve judgments about specific events, which guide
the search for memories (i.e., recollective experiences).
With these models in mind, one could describe the various key concepts in this research domain as
follows. Subjective probability (likelihood) of an event refers to a subjective estimate of the probability
that the event reflects a genuinely experienced event. In line with Koehler (1991), one’s overt expression
of the subjective probability of a particular event is what we term confidence. A belief, on the other
hand, emerges when one’s confidence in the reality of an event is strong enough as to have little doubt
about the veracity of the event. In that case, one comes to believe that one has experienced a certain
event. This is primarily derived from other knowledge. Of course, beliefs may vary in strength and they
may be true or false. When one believes in the veracity of a particular event and one has a concrete,
narrative, episodic recollection together with an image of the event, one can speak of a memory of the
event. Again, a memory can be true or false.8. Behavioral sequence
Some authors fail to articulate the distinction between false belief and false memory. For example,
Lampinen, Neuschatz, and Payne (1998, p.182) define false memories as b[. . .] false beliefs about the
past that are experienced as memories.Q Yet, in our opinion, false memories are more than just plain
beliefs. That is, if people remember something happening, they will be likely to believe that it happened.
However, believing in one’s birth is not the same as having a memory of it (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002).
Moreover, not every belief or memory is of equal significance. A particular belief or memory is of
demonstrable significance only when a person acts on it. Following the pragmatic tradition that
considers memory in the service of overt behavior (e.g., Fiske, 1992; Neisser, 1996), one could take the
stance that the significance of a belief or memory can be derived from its behavioral sequence. This
sequence can vary from passing the false information on to others (e.g., a confederate of the experiment),
searching for additional information by talking to family or friends, or, in the case of a false confession,
T. Smeets et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 25 (2005) 917–934 927accepting a conviction. The recovered-false memory debate was, of course, fuelled by high publicity
cases in which patients took legal action on the basis of their recovered memories. This leads us to
conclude that the strongest demonstration of an experimentally induced false memory would be one in
which participants not only come up with detailed reports about the false event, but also act on the basis
of these reports. We are not alone in this conclusion. Thus, having discussed a new experimental
approach in which imagination inflation was found to contribute to people’s food aversion, Loftus (2003,
p. 870) recently concluded that bOne might then be able to show that false memories have consequences,
that they do matter.Q
Recent work by Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, and Relyea (2004) suggests that confidence, false beliefs,
and false memories can best be viewed as nested constructs. That is, having a memory of an event
generally implies a belief that the event happened and, likewise, having autobiographical belief generally
implies that the event is seen as plausible. However, if someone rates the probability of a certain event
low or, for that matter, beliefs in the event, but shows no memory of it, this is not necessarily an end
stage. When elaborating about a fictitious event, for example during therapy sessions in which
imagination or hypnosis is repeatedly used, one’s confidence in the event might increase. With more
sessions, one may then shift from disbelief to belief that the false event has happened and eventually, one
might shift from believing to actually constructing a false memory about a fictitious event. In current
research on imagination inflation, several studies have found evidence that familiarity rather than reality
monitoring failures drive the imagination inflation effect (e.g., Thomas et al., 2003). Perhaps, then,
familiarity with the false event precedes increases in confidence and upward shifts in belief, while reality
monitoring failures precede full-blown false memories. Moreover, response criterion9 shifts may be
responsible for changing from disbelief to belief. An example might clarify this. Suppose that during the
course of a treatment session, the therapist exposes his/her patient to the suggestion that childhood
trauma is the source of the patient’s current complaints. Possibly, the patient will put his or her trust in
the therapist. As a result, the patient may come to believe that he or she was a victim of childhood sexual
abuse. At that point, however, the patient need not have any memories of the abuse. As time passes and
after elaborating on the issue of abuse (e.g., with regression therapy or imagination exercises), clear,
vivid, and detailed images of the abuse may emerge. However, only when the patient acts upon the basis
of these images, like seeking confirmation from possible witnesses or confronting the alleged
perpetrator, it becomes apparent that the patient takes his/her recovered images as real memories.9. Anxiety research
Of course, there is no need for behavioral consequences to be exclusively related to memories. That
is, one may act on the mere basis of a firmly held belief that does not possess any mnemonic qualities.
Evidence for this comes from anxiety research on a cognitive bias termed Thought–Action Fusion (TAF;
e.g., Rachman, 1993; Rachman & Shafran, 1999) and from experimental work on indirect pathways to
fear acquisition (e.g., Field, Argyris, & Knowles, 2001; Field & Lawson, 2003). Rachman (1993),
Rachman and Shafran (1999), and Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman (1996) have identified a cognitive9
The consideration of how accurate information has to be judged in order for it to be reported. Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) call this the pre-set
criterion probability.
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distortion (TAF) refers to a bias that may increase people’s sense of responsibility for their intrusive
thoughts and, hence, can be regarded as a vulnerability factor for the development of clinical obsessions
(e.g., Rachman & Shafran, 1999; Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, & Spaan, 1999). TAF involves two
separate components: probability and moral TAF. Probability TAF refers to OCD patients’ tendency to
believe that their intrusive thoughts increase the probability that a specific negative event will occur.
Thus, OCD patients assume that having intrusive thoughts about, say, their parents suffering from an
illness, will increase the probability that this will happen. Moral TAF refers to the belief that
experiencing an intrusive thought (e.g., about an aggressive act) is morally equivalent to actually
carrying out the prohibited action. There is ample evidence that OCD patients give high probability
ratings for negative events as a result of their negative thoughts (e.g., Shafran et al., 1996; Amir,
Freshman, Ramsey, Neary, & Brigidi, 2001). Thus, these patients believe they can be held responsible
for the anticipated negative event and this motivates them to engage in compulsive checking behavior
(e.g., Rachman, 2002). Clearly, these checking behaviors are based on the patients’ sheer beliefs that
they are responsible for future events.
Interestingly, Ladouceur et al. (1995; experiment 2) demonstrated that beliefs about responsibility
affect checking behaviors. Thus, Ladouceur et al. had their participants sort 200 pills (medication for a
deadly virus) of 10 different color combinations (20 capsules of each color) that were initially placed in a
bowl. Participants were instructed to put the pills in semi-transparent bottles, and were either told that
this was merely a pilot test (low responsibility group) or that their test performance would have a great
and immediate impact (e.g., on the distribution of pills among poor people for which a wrong
combination of colors could have lethal consequences). Compared to low responsibility participants, the
high responsibility group exhibited a stronger preoccupation with errors and they experienced more
subjective anxiety to make errors. More importantly, participants in the high responsibility group showed
stronger hesitations in sorting the pills and they more often engaged in checking behaviors.
Another good example of behavior associated with pure belief (i.e., without memory) can be found in
the experimental work of Field et al. (2001) and Field and Lawson (2003). In two experiments, Field et
al. (2001) provided children aged 7 through 9 (N=40 and N=45, respectively) with either positive (e.g.,
bvery friendlyQ) or negative (e.g., bvery dangerousQ) information about toy monsters that were
completely new to the children. Field et al. found that children showed increased scores on a fear-belief
questionnaire concerning the monster about which they had received the negative information. In a
subsequent study using Australian marsupials (i.e., the quoll, quokka, and cuscus) that were unfamiliar
to the participants, Field and Lawson (2003) presented 6 to 9 year olds (N=59) with negative, positive or
neutral information about the animals. Not only did negative information significantly increase
children’s fear beliefs (measured by self-report and implicit measures of the belief), but it also elicited
avoidance behavior. That is, children were more reluctant to approach a box which they believed
contained the animal they had previously received negative information about. Evidently, increased fear
beliefs were the antecedent of this behavioral consequence.10. A look at future research
Experiments in the domain of anxiety research offer inspiring examples of how one can address the
behavioral consequences of beliefs and memories. This is important because only a handful of studies
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may help to explain why it is informative to look at behavioral consequences. Suppose an individual has
been ripped off for hundreds of dollars in purchasing a new car. When buying another vehicle, he/she
will probably not go to the same car seller again. This, of course, has to do with remembering the bad
investment. If, on the other hand, the individual sees it only as a remote possibility that the car seller has
sold bad cars, he/she may very well visit the car seller for a second time. So, the behavior of the
individual tells us something about his/her beliefs or memories about the car seller.
Consider this hypothetical experiment. Suppose that participants would imagine having experienced a
traumatic childhood incident with a spider. Would they react with phobic anxiety when exposed to a
spider?10 Or suppose one would tell participants that their dreams mean that as a child, they became
nauseous each time they ate cereals for breakfast. Would that lead to these participants start to avoid
eating cereals? As a matter of fact, Loftus (2003) recently found some tentative evidence that these
consequences can, indeed, be elicited with typical false memory manipulations. When Alan Alda11
visited Loftus for television recordings, he completed a number of questionnaires about his food
preferences, eating habits, and his personality (Loftus, 2003). During a follow-up session, Alda was told
that an analysis of the questionnaires had revealed that he had an aversion to hard-boiled eggs. Loftus
and her research associates tried to convince Alda that as a child, he must have gotten sick after eating
too many hard-boiled eggs. They succeeded, because after a while, Alda increasingly showed behavioral
signs of believing in the authenticity of the fabricated story. During a picnic, Alda was offered a few
hard-boiled eggs amongst other foods. Alda refused to eat the eggs. Of course, Alda’s reluctance to eat
the hard-boiled eggs may be due to a number of causes, but the example demonstrates how one might
examine the behavioral consequences of false beliefs and false memories.
One research line that has explicitly focused on behavioral consequences of false beliefs and false
memories is that concerned with false confessions. Kassin and Kiechel’s (1996) classic study showed
that it is relatively easy to obtain false confessions of healthy undergraduates. These authors instructed
their participants to copy letters that were presented on a computer screen. Participants were told not to
touch the Alt-key because otherwise the computer would crash. During the task, the computer did crash
and participants were falsely accused of having touched the forbidden key. Next, participants were asked
to sign a written confession and they were approached by a confederate of the experiment who acted as a
naı¨ve subject. This confederate asked the participant about what happened. Kassin and Kiechel found
that many participants (depending on the precise conditions between 35% and 100%) were willing to
sign a written confession. A smaller portion of them (depending on the conditions between 0% and 65%)
related to the confederate how they had touched the forbidden Alt-key. At the very least, this suggests
that these participants firmly believed that they had touched the forbidden key. That is, they had
internalized the false confession.
A replication study by Horselenberg, Merckelbach, and Josephs (2003) explored whether false
confessions would manifest themselves in more far-reaching behavioral consequences. Following a
procedure that was similar to that of Kassin and Kiechel, these authors investigated whether their falsely
accused participants would accept a negative consequence of confessing, in this case paying a
considerable amount of money. The results of Horselenberg et al. indicate that especially those10
This issue is currently under investigation in our laboratory.
11
Alan Alda is the host of Scientific American Frontiers, a popular American t.v. show, and is widely known from his role as Hawkeye Pierce
in the classic t.v. series M*A*S*H.
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up study by Horselenberg et al. (in press) shows that even when event plausibility is low and stakes are
high (e.g., being falsely accused of exam fraud), some undergraduates falsely confess. Redlich and
Goodman (2003) recently investigated whether children aged 12 and 13 (N=32), children aged 15 and
16 (N=32), and young adults aged 18–26 (N=32) were willing to accept a highly aversive consequence
of falsely confessing, namely returning for approximately 10 h and reenter the lost data. These authors
found that, on average, 69% of their participants falsely confessed to hitting the forbidden key and, thus,
were willing to accept the negative consequence. In our view, this type of approach offers good examples
of how one may study the behavioral manifestations of firmly held misinterpretations (false beliefs) and
false memories.12
Paying systematic attention to the behavioral consequences of false beliefs and false memories will
enable us to formulate more fine graded models on how confidence may develop into beliefs and
memories. Apart from theoretical issues, there is one practical reason for focusing on overt behavioral
consequences of memory manipulations. As already noted, one key issue in recovered memories is that
people who have them are so convinced of their accuracy that they act on the basis of their memories
(e.g., by filing a lawsuit or by confronting family members). The parallel between laboratory
experiments and real life examples of recovered memories will become much more compelling if these
experiments involve overt behavior (e.g., avoiding cues, signing a confession, talking to a confederate)
that only makes sense when it is assumed that the actor holds firm beliefs or has detailed memories that
he/she believes to be accurate.Acknowledgements
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